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"INVISIBLE" CONSTRAINTS ON
LAWYERING AND LEADERSHIP:
THE CASE OF WOMEN LAWYERS
Mary Jane Mossman*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a strength of patriarchy in all its historic forms to assimilate
itself so perfectly to socioeconomic, political, and cultural structures as to
be virtually invisible.,
This essay is an exploration of "invisible" constraints on ideas about
the proper role for women in the legal profession. It focuses first on the
historical struggle for women's admission as lawyers in Canada in the
early part of this century (the issue of whether women could be lawyers
at all), and secondly on the current status of women lawyers in Canada
(the issue of whether women can become leaders in the legal profession).
In both cases, there is some evidence that "invisible" ideas about the
proper role for women, which prevented their acceptance as "lawyers"
in the early years of this century, may impede their success in becoming
"leaders" in the profession in the 1980's and beyond. For this reason,
these invisible constraints have both historical and current significance
for women, and men, who are lawyers.
This essay also represents an effort to bridge two separate parts of
my research activity about women lawyers, one historical and one more
current, and to examine the connections between them. For several years,
I have been interested in the legal aspects of the history of the first
Canadian women admitted to the legal profession. The types of legal
arguments presented and usually rejected, the reasons given for negative
court decisions on the question of women's admission to legal practice,
and the content of statutory amendments to legislation about qualifications
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to practise law have provided a rich source of ideas about the role of
such women in the early twentieth century. More recently, I have become
interested in the social and cultural contexts of these legal decisions, and
the significant extent to which the reasons given by courts mirrored
opinions and ideas expressed in secondary legal literature of the time.
Indeed, the similarity between the views expressed in the law journals
and in judicial decisions raises important questions about the contextual
shaping of judicial decisions, both then and now.
The other part of my research has focused more specifically on the
current status of women as lawyers in Canada, and the significance of
the dramatic increase in the numbers of women entering the legal pro-
fession here since about 1970. In this context, issues about the structure
and organization of the profession and of law firms, the professional
ethos of law practice, and the roles expected of and accepted by lawyers
in different kinds of law practices all have importance for women members
of the profession now and for the future. Moreover, to the extent that
these structures and ideas were designed and implemented by an exclu-
sively male profession, it is important to determine whether a significant
change in the gender composition of the profession may require changes
of structures and ideas, and how such changes may occur. In this context,
theoretical literature about the sociology of organizations and the nature
of societal change provide interesting models for examining the potential
for change in the legal profession.
Thus, in thinking about women lawyers, both in terms of historical
and current struggles for acceptance, the issue is whether there are in-
visible ideas about the proper role for women which just as surely impede
women's achievement of leadership roles in the profession now as once
prevented them from being lawyers at all. Or, as Joan Kelly argues, are
we now at a moment in history when we can not only " 'see' how the
patriarchal system works, but also . . . act with that vision - so as to
put an end to it."2
I. WOMEN LAWYERS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
When Clara Brett Martin became the first woman in the British
Commonwealth to be admitted to the legal profession in 1897, she ex-
pressed a wish that her accomplishment might "open the way for others
2 Ibid. at 62.
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of my sex". 3 In fact, there is little evidence that Clara Brett Martin's
achievement had any effect on similar decisions in other provinces in
Canada. In three of these provinces (New Brunswick, British Columbia
and Quebec), the issue of women's admissibility to the profession was
litigated in the twenty years immediately after Clara Brett Martin became
a lawyer in Ontario 4, and in all three provinces, the applications for
admission to the legal profession by women were denied by the courts.
In New Brunswick and in British Columbia, however, Mabel Penury
French was eventually successful in achieving admission as a lawyer as
a result of subsequent legislative action5 expressly providing for the
admission of women as members of the legal profession.
1. The Nature of the Legal Claims:
Despite the similarity in the outcomes of the three litigated cases,
the claims made by the applicants were quite different. Mabel Penury
French had been admitted as a student-at-law in New Brunswick in 1902
3 Quoted from an interview with Clara Brett Martin published in the Buffalo
Express about 1896, in C. Backhouse, 'To Open the Way for Others of my Sex': Clara
Brett Martin's Career as Canada's First Woman Lawyer (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 1 at 22.
Backhouse provides an excellent account of Clara Brett Martin's efforts to obtain approval
for her admission as a lawyer from the Law Society of Upper Canada, and her ultimate
success as a result of legislative amendments expressly permitting women to be admitted
as members of the legal profession in Ontario. Clara Brett Martin's efforts resulted in
two statutory amendments in Ontario, one permitting women to be admitted to law
practice as solicitors: An Act to Provide for the Admission of Women to the Study and
Practice of Law, S.O. 1892, c. 32, s. 1 and a further amendment permitting them to
practise as barristers-at-law: An Act to Amend the Act to provide for the admission of
Women to the Study and Practice of Law, S.O. 1895, c. 27, s. 1.
4 In New Brunswick, Mabel Penury French's application was denied in 1905; see
In re French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359 (S.C.). Her application for admission as a lawyer
in British Columbia was also denied in 1911 and a subsequent appeal to the Court of
Appeal was dismissed; see Re French (1910-12), 17 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.). In 1915, Annie
Macdonald Langstaff's application for mandamus to permit her to sit the examination
preliminary to her becoming a student-at-law in Quebec was denied and this decision
was upheld (with different reasons) on appeal; see Langstaff v. Bar of Quebec (1915),
47 R.J.Q. 131 (C.S.), and (1916), 25 R.J.Q. 11 (B.R.).
5 In New Brunswick, the Act to remove the Disability of Women so far as relates
to the Study and Practice of the Law, N.B.S. 1906, c. 5, provided that:
"1. Nothwithstanding [sic] any law, regulation, by-law or custom to the
contrary, women shall be admitted to the study of the law, and shall be
called and admitted as barristers and attorneys, upon the same terms, and
subject to the like conditions and regulations as men.
Section 2 of the Act gave retrospective approval to any women admitted to the study
of the law prior to the enactment of this legislation.
In British Columbia, see S.B.C. 1912, c. 18. The legislative amendment in British
Columbia used the same title as that in New Brunswick, and section 1 of the British
Columbia legislation was identical in wording to that in New Brunswick, except that
the British Columbia Act used the word "solicitors" where the New Brunswick Act
used the word "attorneys". The British Columbia Act did not contain the retrospective
clause (section 2) which appeared in the New Brunswick Act.
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and had successfully completed all her studies and examinations when
she requested the Council of the Barristers' Society of New Brunswick
to recommend her for admission as a lawyer. The Council considered
her request and passed a resolution recommending her for admission as
a lawyer, "subject to the opinion of the court as to her sex being under
existing laws a bar to her admission .... 6
The Barristers' Society ratified the Council's resolution and au-
thorized Mr. Connell, President of the Society, to present it to the court
with the authorities relevant to the issue of whether a woman was eligible
for admission as a lawyer. At issue was the meaning of the word "persons"
in the Barristers' Society Act7 which regulated admission to the practice
of law, and both Mr. Connell and two other barristers argued forcefully
that the word should be interpreted broadly so as to permit French to
become a lawyer. Despite these arguments, however, the court unani-
mously concluded that the legislature's use of the word "persons", con-
strued in the context of an exclusively male legal profession, could not
have been intended to permit women's admission to the practice of law.
When French subsequently sought admission as a lawyer in British
Columbia, her application was considered both on its own merits and as
a request for transfer from New Brunswick to British Columbia. The
British Columbia legislation, like that in New Brunswick, authorized the
admission of qualified "persons",s but the details of the qualifications
6 In re French, supra, note 4 at 359.
7 C.S.N.B. 1903, c. 68; subsection 13(1), authorized the Society to make rules
for "the admission of persons to the study of the law and the periods and conditions of
study". (It is interesting that section 15, which excused from the Society's examinations
any candidate holding a Bachelor of Civil Law degree from King's College in Saint
John, used the masculine pronoun throughout.) The Rules and Regulations of the Bar-
risters' Society, found in the Appendix to 36 N.B.R. also used the masculine pronoun
when referring to candidates for admission to law practice. However, two sections of
the Interpretation Act, C.S.N.B., 1903, c. 1, seemed to make masculine pronouns
referable to females as well as to males: subsection 8 (31) provided that the word
"person" included "any party or person ... to which the context is capable of applying";
and section 10 stated that "Every word ... importing the masculine gender [may extend]
to females as well as males".
8 Paragraph 37(3)(a) of the Legal Professions Act, R.S.B.C. 1897, c. 24 provided
for the admission to law practice of "any person" who met the qualifications described
therein. As well, paragraph 37(3)(b) provided for the admission to practice of:
[a]ny person being a British subject of full age, good conduct and repute,
who has been duly called and admitted to practise . . . as a Barrister-at-
Law in any of Her Majesty's Colonies, Dependencies, or Provinces of
Canada; ...
The section went on to describe the further qualifications and provisos, including, for
example, that "he shall have resided in the Province during the said period of six
months .. "
Subsection 10(13) of the British Columbia Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1897, c.
1, provided that "Words importing . . . the masculine gender only shall include ...
females as well as males, and the converse." Subsection 10(14) also provided that "The
word 'person' shall include any body corporate or politic, or party, . . . to whom the
[Vol. 20:3
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were described in the statute with the use of masculine pronouns. The
court concluded that "the Interpretation Act could not be used to bring
about so radical a change" 9 in the law, and denied French's application
for admission. Following the court's rejection of her application, however,
French continued to work in a Vancouver law firm, and by chance her
plight was drawn to the attention of Evlyn Fenwick Farris, an activist
and co-founder of the University Women's Club of Vancouver. 10 It was
because of Farris' persistence that the British Columbia legislature even-
tually passed an amending statute permitting women like French to prac-
tise law there."
By contrast with French, Annie Macdonald Langstaff commenced
her litigation after graduating from the Faculty of Law at McGill Uni-
versity.12 She presented herself for the examination preliminary to be-
coming a student-at-law on July 7, 1914 and when the board of examiners
refused to permit her to take the examination, she issued a writ of
mandamus against the Bar of the Province of Quebec requesting a court
order permitting her to take the examination.
In the Supreme Court, the Bar "strenuously"' 13 opposed the appli-
cation on three grounds, including the fact that Langstaff was a woman,
"and what was still more objectionable, a woman under marital author-
ity". 14 In considering this ground, the court decided that the use of the
context can apply according to law."
According to a later source, French knew that she could "demand recognition as
an interprovincial courtesy but wanted to be admitted by right and not by favour." See
C. Mullins, Mabel Penury French (1986), 44 ADvoCATE 676 at 677. In the Court of
Appeal, counsel for the Law Society of British Columbia (opposing French's application)
suggested that French would obtain a "right and privilege denied to British Columbia
women" if she were to be admitted pursuant to paragraph 37(3)(b). In the end, neither
route was successful.
9 Re French, supra, note 4 at 8.
10 R.J. Pazdro, Of British Columbia Suffragists and Barristers (1980), 2:4 CAN.
WOMEN'S STUDmS, 15 at 17.
It Ibid. For details of the statutory amendment, see supra, note 5.
12 See B. Baines, Women and the Law in S. Burt, L. Code, and L. Dorney,
CHANGING PATrERNS: WOMEN IN CANADA (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1988) 157
at 159-60. Despite her rejection by the Quebec Bar, Annie Macdonald Langstaff worked
for a law firm until she retired in 1965 at the age of 78. She was never admitted to the
legal profession because by the time the Quebec legislature enacted the amending statute
(for the admission of women) in 1941, both a law degree and an undergraduate degree
were required for admission; Macdonald Langstaff had a law degree, but not an un-
dergraduate degree. Baines, at 163, quoting M. Gillet, WE WALKED VERY WARILY A
HISTORY OF WOMEN AT MCGILL (Montreal: Eden Press Women's Publications, 1981) at
309. For general information on the history of women and the professions in Quebec,
see M. Dumont et al., QUEBEC WOMEN: A HISTORY (Toronto: The Women's Press,
1987) at 220.
13 Langstaff v. Bar of Quebec, supra, note 4 at 132.
14 Ibid. at 133. According to the case report at 132, however, Dame Langstaff
was "separated as to property from Samuel Gilbert Langstaff". According to Baines,
supra, note 12, at 163, quoting Gillet at 305, it has been suggested that "In a Province
that did not grant divorce and that 'protected' its women to such an extent that husbands'
authorizations in writing were required before they could contract any obligations, the
fact that Annie Langstaff was separated from her husband set the seal on her lost cause."
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masculine pronouns in the legislation could not be construed so as to
include the feminine,15 in the absence of proof of intent on the part of
the legislature and citing both English and French laws to this effect.16
Having denied Langstaff's application to sit the preliminary examinations,
Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre expressed the hope that "her ambition in life
should be directed towards the seeking of a field of labor more suitable
to the sex and more likely to ensure for her the success in life to which
her irreprocheable [sic] conduct and remarkable talents give her the right
to aspire."'17
Thus, all three of the women's challenges to the courts were un-
successful, even though their cases were otherwise quite distinctive.
Whether the applicant had completed Society examinations (as French
in New Brunswick) or a university law degree (as Langstaff in Quebec);
whether the application was an original application for admission (as
French in New Brunswick) or one for admission also by way of transfer
(as French in British Columbia); whether the legislation used gender-
neutral language and referred to "persons" (as did the legislation in both
New Brunswick and British Columbia) or more specifically masculine
pronouns (as in Quebec); and whether the profession supported women's
admission as lawyers (as they apparently did in New Brunswick) or
opposed it (as in both British Columbia and Quebec), resulted in no
different consequences for the outcome of the three cases in the courts.
In each case, the courts denied the claim that women could be lawyers,
15 The Bar of the Province of Quebec Act S.Q.(1886), c. 34 provided for the
admission to the study or practice of the profession in Section Sixth [sic]. E.g. Section
43 provided that the candidate for admission to practice:
"[S]hall mention his name, surname, age, residence, whether he is a British
subject by birth or naturalization, the date of his admission to study, of the
registration of his certificate and of his indentures, ...
The Civil Code of 1785 of France, chapter IV provided, however, for the admission of
"persons" as barristers, and the Schedule to the Code provided expressly that "The
masculine gender includes both sexes, unless it appears by the context that it is only
applicable to one of them." Similarly, R.S.Q. 1909, art. 21 provided that "The masculine
gender includes both sexes, unless it appears by the context that it is only applicable to
one of them."
16 The court referred to the U.K. decision Bebb v. Law Society (1913), 29 T.L.R.
634, 109 L.T. 36 (Ch. D.); aff'd [1914] 1 Ch. 286, 83 L.J. Ch. 363 (C.A.); and also
to the French Civil Code. In relation to the French law, Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre stated:
"I will admit however that in France the obstacle in the way of the admission
of the female sex to the exercise of the profession of the law which existed
under the old "coutumes" and even under the Code Napoldon have since
been removed, but it must be remembered that it was through special
legislation that this result was obtained and not in virtue of the old coutume,
nor yet under any of the law as embodied in the Code Napol6on, although
it contained a disposition similar to that which is to be found in article 17th
of our own code.
Supra, note 4 at 142.
17 Langstaff, ibid. at 145.
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upholding the male exclusivity of the legal profession until legislative
action expressly permitted women to become lawyers.'8
2. The Legal Reasoning Denying the Claims:
Despite the factual differences in the three cases, the legal reasoning
on the part of the judges is remarkably similar. In French's case in New
Brunswick, five judges heard the arguments and three wrote decisions.19
The arguments included references to authorities which supported wom-
en's exclusion from the practice of law20 and to those which recognized
women's admissibility as lawyers.21 Mr. Connell, on behalf of the Bar-
risters' Society, also noted that Ontario had passed enabling legislation
but that five states of the United States had admitted women as attorneys
without enabling statutes. 22 His submissions were supported by another
counsel who argued that there was no authority binding on the court
which held that women were not at common law entitled to be admitted
as attorneys in British courts. 23
By contrast, Mr. Skinner, recorder of the city of Saint John, who
also argued for the admissibility of women as lawyers, suggested that
18 For an analysis of male exclusivity in the legal profession, see A. Sachs and
J. H. Wilson, SEXISM AND THE LAW: MALE BELIEFS AND THE LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN
AND THE UNrrED STATES (New York: Free Press, 1979). In all provinces in Canada,
women were admitted to the legal profession only after legislative amendments. The
first women lawyers were admitted to practise in Alberta and Manitoba in 1915, in
Saskatchewan in 1917, in Nova Scotia in 1918, in Prince Edward Island in 1926, and
in Newfoundland in 1933. Women were not, however, admitted to the legal profession
in Quebec until 1942. For a survey of women in the legal profession in Canada, see C.
Harvey, Women in Law in Canada (1970-71) 4 MAN. L.J. 9, especially at 17-20.
19 In re French, supra, note 4. Mr. Justice Tuck and Mr. Justice Hanington wrote
separate opinions; Mr. Justice McLeod and Mr. Justice Gregory concurred in the opinion
written by Mr. Justice Barker.
20 Ibid. at 360. The authorities cited by Mr. Connell as amicus curiae for the
Barristers' Society included Chorlton v. Lings (1868), L.R. 4 C.P. 374; Beresford-Hope
v. Sandhurst (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 79 (C.A.); Bradwell v. Illinois 16 Wall. 130 (U.S.
1872); Robinson's Case 131 Mass. 376 (1889); In re Leonard 53 Am. Rep. 323 (Or.
1885); and 3 Am. AND ENG. ENCY. (2nd ed.), 285, 286 and 287.
21 Ibid. The authorities cited by Mr. Connell included Ricker's Case 66 N.H. 207
(1890); In re Hall 47 Am. Rep. 625 (Conn. 1882); Re Thomas 13 Lawyers' R. 538
(Colo. 1891); and Cummings v. Missouri 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1866).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. Mr. Bustin is not further identified in the report of the decision. In his
argument, he suggested that Chorlton v. Lings and Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst were
not relevant to the issue of the admissibility of women as lawyers: "[I]f they are not
excluded by the common law on the ground that a woman is ineligible to hold a public
office, and it is submitted they are not, for the office of an attorney-at-law is not a public
office...".
In the article by Mullins, supra, note 8 at 676, Mr. Bustin is identified as Stephen
Bustin, the senior partner at Bustin & Porter in Saint John - the law firm where French
was articled. Mullins' account also reported that French "led her classes" at King's
College Law School in Saint John, from which she graduated with a bachelor of civil
law degree in June 1905.
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the court should decide the case "on the real merits" since there was no
English authority that was binding and the American authorities were
"about evenly balanced". 24 Further, the Ontario statute was "somewhat
peculiar" and might be taken as declaratory.25 Thus, in considering the
real merits, he suggested that:
The trend of the recent legislation, both political and judicial, is to remove
the disabilities of women and open to them every avenue leading to avo-
cations which may enable them to earn a livelihood. Why delve into the
dark ages for a precedent to justify holding them incompetent or by law
disqualified from exercising a calling to which we have every reason to
believe, from their successes in our universities and in the professions which
have been opened to them, they will bring to bear equal intelligence, greater
diligence and devotion to duty than men?26
In responding to the submissions of counsel, Chief Justice Tuck
dismissed the arguments based on "the advanced thought of the age and
the right of women to share with men in all paying public activities";
as he stated laconically, "they did not mention either police constables
or the army." 27 For his part, he thought that women should not compete
with men and that they should attend to "their own legitimate business." 28
He concluded that the word "persons" in the statute applied only to males
since "it was never in the contemplation of the legislature that a woman
should be admitted an attorney of this court." 29 Mr. Justice Hanington
generally agreed, noting that in most other jurisdictions, the admission
of women as lawyers had been accomplished by statutory amendment.
Thus, in his view:
The remedy in this case is with the legislature and not with this court.
Whatever our individual opinions may be as to the advisability of extending
the right to women, we are bound by the law of this country as we now
find it.30
These negative views about the admissibility of women as lawyers
were even more strongly expressed in the decision of Mr. Justice Barker.
Citing Bradwell v. Illinois31 and Robinson's Case32 at some length, he
affirmed the idea of separate spheres for men and women, "founded in
the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things", 33 and concluded
that there was no right at common law for women to practise as attorneys.
24 In re French, supra, note 4 at 360.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. at 360-361.
27 Ibid. at 361.
28 Ibid. at 362.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. at 363.
31 Supra, note 20.
32 Ibid.
33 In re French, supra, note 4 at 365-366.
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He also concluded that the statute's use of the gender-neutral word "per-
sons" could not signify the admissibility of women to the legal profession
because when the statute was first enacted in 1846, no women were
lawyers and therefore the word "persons" meant only men. Thus, in his
view, the statute had never been intended to make "the radical change"
suggested by the applicant, and "by every rule of construction applicable
to such a case th[e] court [was] bound to hold that no such change [had]
been made." 34
Both the argument about the existence of a right at common law
and the argument as to whether the word "persons" in the statutes con-
templated women reoccurred when French sought admission to the legal
profession in British Columbia. Counsel for the Law Society submitted
that women had no common law right to be admitted as lawyers, and
that the use of the word "persons" in the statute was not sufficient as
an express statutory authority for the admission of women; he cited In
re French in New Brunswick as authority for both these arguments. 35 By
contrast, counsel for French argued that the passage of legislation in both
Ontario and in New Brunswick was merely declaratory of the existing
law. He also argued that the word "persons" should be broadly inter-
preted, and that the B.C. statute made provision for the admission by
transfer of barristers and solicitors, duly qualified, from other provinces;
since French was a barrister and solicitor, duly qualified in New Brun-
swick, she was clearly entitled to be admitted.
At the initial hearing, Mr. Justice Morrison agreed with the Law
Society that the words of the statute could not be interpreted so broadly
as to admit women as lawyers, and on appeal, the three judges in the
Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with the initial decision. 36 According
to Chief Justice MacDonald, the "trend of authority at common law [was]
that women [were] not eligible" for admission as lawyers.37 There was
no authority supporting the applicant's position in Canada or in England,
and although there were some American authorities in her favour, the
one decided by the Supreme Court of the United States [Bradwell v.
Illinois] denied the applicant's claim. Even if there were "cogent reasons
for a change based upon changes in the legal status of women,. . . [the
court would be] usurping the functions of the Legislature rather than
discharging the duty of the Court, which is to decide what the law is,
not what it ought to be."38
Mr. Justice Irving agreed. In deciding that the word "persons" did
not include women, he referred to In re Duke of Somerset,39 a decision
34 Ibid. at 371.
35 Re French, supra, note 4.
36 Ibid. Both Chief Justice MacDonald and Mr. Justice Irving wrote decisions on
the appeal, and Mr. Justice Galliher concurred in the decision to dismiss FTench's appeal.
37 Ibid. at 4.
31 Ibid. at 4-5.
39 (1887), 34 Ch. D. 465.
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in 1887 concerning the inability of a woman to be guardian ad litem to
an infant; and the MIRROR OF JUSTICE, a legal book believed to have
been written at the time of William the Conqueror.40 He also referred to
the statutes of British Columbia concerned with the admission of lawyers,
and concluded:
To my mind, having regard to the common law disability above referred
to, this fact that no woman has ever been admitted in England, is conclusive
that the word 'person' in our own Act was not intended to include a woman.
The context of our Act refers to a profession for men, and men alone.41
Thus, the fact that amending legislation had been enacted in both
Ontario and in New Brunswick to enable women to be admitted to the
legal profession demonstrated that the British Columbia statute would
similarly require amendment to accommodate French's wish to become
a lawyer there.
The reasoning in Langstaff's case in Quebec is remarkably similar
to that in both cases involving French, even though Langstaff's case
involved the interpretation of the Quebec Civil Code. At the initial hear-
ing, Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre dismissed Langstaff's application for man-
damus, and his decision was confirmed on appeal. However, one judge
in the appeal court, Mr. Justice Lavergne, dissented from this conclusion,
the only judge to do so in any of the three litigated cases about women
lawyers.
In relation to the issue of whether women could be admitted as
lawyers, counsel for Langstaff argued that the use of the masculine
40 Re French, supra, note 4 at 6. Citing PULLING ON ATTORNEYS, 3rd ed., at 8,
he stated that this work stated that "femes ne poient estre attorneys". Mr. Justice Irving
referred to this work as the MIRROR OF JUSTICE, but it is referred to as the MIRROR OF
JUSTICES in a note in A. Pulling, THE ORDER OF THE COIF (London: William Clowes
and Sons, 1884). Pulling acknowledges that "the antiquity and even the authenticity"
of the book have been "the subject of controversy":
The book first appeared in a printed form in 1642; but there are numerous
very old MS. copies, one among the Harl.MSS. in the British Museum...
In the English printed edition, 1768, by William Hughes of Gray's Inn, the
'Mirror of Justices' is boldly stated to have been written in the old French
long before the Conquest. . . . (Emphasis in original)
41 Ibid. In the later case of Bebb v. Law Society, supra, note 16 at 629 there was
considerable disagreement about the authority of the MIRROR OF JUSTICES between
counsel in the case. However, the Master of the Rolls, Cozens-Hardy stated conclusively
that:
The Mirror may not be, and I think is not a work of the highest possible
authority, but the reference to the Mirror, and seeing what antiquity has
said, does not in the least, in my view, take away from the opinion of Lord
Coke. And the opinion of Lord Coke on the matter of what is or what is
not the common law is one which requires no sanction from anybody else.
The three judges in the Bebb case also unanimously concurred in the conclusion that
women could not be admitted as solicitors in England.
[Vol. 20:3
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pronoun should be interpreted so as to include both sexes,42 and that
there was nothing in the context justifying male exclusivity in the legal
profession. Indeed, "it would be contrary to the spirit of the Canadian
system of law and particularly to that of the province of Quebec to permit
said tendency to be controled [sic] and hampered by antiquated rules and
usages. . . ."43 In his decision, Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre carefully noted
that his role was not to decide whether it would be "more fair and more
reasonable" to permit women to become lawyers, but only whether the
legislature had intended to include women when it used the male pronoun
in the statute.44
In ascertaining the legislature's intention, Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre
decided that he must have regard to "the context and purpose of the
whole act:"45
Now, taking that rule as a guide, who would presume to assert that in the
Militia Act, for instance, or in the Acts dealing with the organization of the
police force or of the fire brigade, the pronoun "He" should be construed
as including the female as well as the male sex?
A woman may be as brave as any man, and scenes which are in the present
time, daily depicted to us, show that many of them are proving their use-
fulness as nurses on the field of battle; but the physical constitution of
woman makes it plain that nature never intended her to take part along with
the stronger sex in the bloody affrays of the battle field.
I would put within the range of possibilities though by no means a com-
mendable one, the admission of a woman to the profession of solicitor or
to that of avoud, but I hold that to admit a woman and more particularly a
married woman as a barrister, that is to say, as a person who pleads cases
at the bar before judges or juries in open court and in the presence of the
public, would be nothing short of a direct infringement upon public order
and a manifest violation of the law of good morals and public decency.46
In addition to these concerns, the judge declared that the absence of
women, "either in literary France, or in practical England" in the legal
profession demonstrated the inappropriateness of such a role for women.
"Who were the best judges of their fitness for such struggles, if they
themselves were not?" he asked.47 Citing Bebb v. Law Society,as he
thereupon dismissed the application.
The initial decision in Langstaff is particularly interesting for its
reasoning because by 1915 there was an English authority denying wom-
42 Paragraph 9 of art. 17, Civil Code, provided that "the masculine gender includes
both sexes, unless it appears by the context that it is applicable to only one of them."
See also the Petitioner's submissions in Langstaff, supra, note 4 at 137.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. at 137-138.
45 Ibid. at 139.
46 Ibid. (Emphasis in original).
47 Ibid. at 140.
48 Supra, note 16.
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en's eligibility to practise law: the Bebb case, reported in the previous
year. Thus, unlike the situation in French's two cases, there was a legal
precedent in England on the issue of women in the legal profession when
it came before the court in Langstaff's case. Yet, because Langstaff's
case arose in Quebec, the only Canadian province where such an English
precedent was not authoritative, it was merely cited and was not deter-
minative of the outcome.
More significantly, as the passage quoted from the judgment of Mr.
Justice Saint-Pierre demonstrates, the Langstaff case was argued during
World War I, at a time when many prevalent ideas about roles for both
men and women were being challenged by the necessities of war. Yet,
despite actual evidence of new roles being assumed by women in the
War, Mr. Justice Saint-Pierre preferred to sanction continuing distinctions
in work appropriate to men and women. Indeed, his views about the
inability of women to participate in the public aspects of a barrister's
role strongly reflect the "separate spheres" doctrine enunciated by Mr.
Justice Barker in French's case in New Brunswick, words then borrowed
from Bradwell v. Illinois decided in 1873. Thus, even though the English
decision in Bebb v. Law Society was not regarded as authoritative in
Langstaff's case, the common law tradition which recognized long-stand-
ing distinctions between men and women exercised a powerful influence
on the legal reasoning in the case.
The existence of new ideas about roles for women is, however,
more evident in the appeal court decision, where Mr. Justice Lavergne
dissented from the majority's conclusion to dismiss the appeal. 49 Focusing
exclusively on the issue of whether women were eligible to practise law,
Mr. Justice Lavergne stated that only the law of the Civil Code was
relevant to determine the issue, and that according to that law, women
were eligible for admission as lawyers.SO In his view, the fact that the
law expressly stated that women could not be notaries,51 could not be
elected to Parliament, and could not serve on juries meant that the leg-
49 Langstaff (B.R.), supra, note 4. Five judges heard the appeal (Chief Justice
Archambeault, Mr. Justice Trenholme, Mr. Justice Lavergne, Mr. Justice Carroll, and
Mr. Justice Pelletier) and four wrote judgments.
50 Ibid. at 12. According to Lavergne, J., decisions from England, the United
States, and other Canadian provinces were not relevant to the decision. As he stated:
Je n'ai pas, je consid~re, m'enqu6rir de la nature du droit dans les autres
pays, ou dans les autres provinces. Notre loi est notre Code civil; c'est
aussi l'acte d'interpr6tation de Qudbec savoir l'article 21 des S. ref., 1909.
51 Ibid. at 13. The legislation concerning admission to the Bar was adopted the
same year as the statute about admission as a notary, and the notarial statute had provided
expressly: "Pour &tre notaire il faut 6tre du sexe masculin ......
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islature's failure to prohibit women from becoming members of the legal
profession signified an intent to permit them to do so:
Le candidat A I'6tude du droit peut 6tre ou du sexe masculin ou du sexe
fdminin sans distinction.... Si le 16gislateur avait voulu dire qu'une femme
ne pourrait 8tre avocat, il l'aurait dit.52
Despite these views, the majority of the court agreed with the conclusion
in the lower court and dismissed Langstaff's appeal. According to Chief
Justice Archambeault, the fact that no women had been admitted to the
Bar demonstrated the absence of legislative intent to include women in
the interpretation of eligibility requirements for the practice of law. Ac-
cordingly, it was a matter for the legislature and not for the court. 53
The consistency of outcome and (almost perfect) unanimity in legal
reasoning in these three cases mask the fact that the judges exercised
choices in their decisions. The absence of any authoritative precedent in
French's case in New Brunswick, for example, created an opportunity
for a more generous interpretation of the word "persons" in the statute.
Her qualification as a barrister and solicitor in another province in Canada
similarly provided an opportunity for her to be admitted pursuant to the
gender-neutral transfer provisions of the statute in British Columbia. And
the reasoning of the sole dissenting judge in Langstaff's case on appeal
offered a compelling justification for interpreting the statute more liberally
than the majority of judges chose to do.
Thus, in choosing to accept some earlier decisions as precedents
while rejecting others, and in choosing to accept one version of legislative
intent rather than others, the judges in these cases were expressing pre-
ferences among competing legal arguments. 54 What is at issue then is
the reason for their choice: why did they choose to maintain the status
quo of male exclusivity in the legal profession rather than permit women
to become lawyers too?
52 Ibid. See also at 14, where Mr. Justice Lavergne considered the practices of
other countries, and noting that women were able to practise as lawyers in many states
of the United States, suggested that "[o]n ne dira pas que les ttats-Unis sont des pays
barbares." And, in an effort to get to the real issue, he concluded:
En quoi l'idde d'admettre les femmes A cette profession, pourrait-elle r6-
pugner? Je dis cela simplement en r6ponse au savant juge de premiere
instance, qui me parait scandalis6 de ce qu'il ait pu entrer dans l'id6e d'une
femme de se faire admettre A 1'6tude du droit. Je n'en dirai pas davantage,
je crois que les femmes devraient 6tre bienvenues atre admises aux profes-
sions libdrales, notamment A celle du Barreau.
53 Ibid. at 20.
54The nature of judicial choice was explored more fully in an earlier article on
the admission cases and the Persons Case; see Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method:
The Difference it Makes (1986) 3 AuST. J. oF L. AND SocITY 30; and (1987) 3 WIsc.
WOMEN'S L.J. 147.
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3. The Context of Legal Decisions about Women as Lawyers:
The relationship between community ideas and judicial decision-
making is one of complexity and constant change, and it is difficult to
demonstrate causal connections precisely55 Yet, the broad social context
within which judicial decisions occur provides at least some evidence of
community values and generally-accepted ideas about the choices re-
quired of judges in the legal system. In this context, the secondary legal
literature in Canada in the early twentieth century offers valuable insights
about the issues before the courts in these cases about women and the
practice of law.
In the late nineteenth century, the legal profession in Canadian
provinces communicated by means of law journals which reported on
topics of interest both in Canada and abroad. The CANADA LAW JOURNAL,
for example, reported in 1869 on the admission of Arabella Mansfield
to the bar of Iowa,56 and a decade later on the successful passage of
legislation permitting women to be admitted to the bar of the United
States.5 7 In both these reports, there is a mixture of light-hearted levity
55 For an excellent analysis of the law's "uneven development" in relation to
changing societal conditions, see C. Smart, Feminism and Law: Some Problems of
Analysis and Strategy (1986) 14 INT. J. OF SOC. OF L. 109.
56 See (1869) 5 CAN. L.J. 307. In part of a letter to the editor, it was suggested
that:
This will gladden the eyes of John Stuart Mill; in fact, the philosopher is
thrown away in benighted (sic) England, he should go to the land when
(sic) the rights of married women are fully understood, and there learn a
thing or two on the subject of his last hobby.... But really it is hardly
fair to the rest of the profession in Iowa, to permit a charming fair one to
pit herself against a learned brother in argument before a jury of twelve
men. The latter would simply have no chance at all .... (Emphasis in
original)
57 See (1879) 15 CAN. L.J. 146. A short note reported that Myra Bradwell (of
the Chicago Legal News) was very cheerful about the passage of the legislation. The
note stated that:
She contests the proposition that it will be necessary to have a nursery
attached to the Court-room, and addressing herself to her noble brothers-
in-law, promises on behalf of professional womankind that they will be very
respectful, and prays in technical language 'don't man-dam-us before we
have had a hearing.
The same note reported that Bella Lockwood had become the first woman to have her
name placed on the roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Interestingly, the next year,
the CANADA LAw JouRNAL reported that Bella Lockwood had herself moved the ad-
mission ("in a clear audible tone") of a lawyer from South Carolina who was a negro
(unnamed in the report). As it happened that Joel Parker, a democratic candidate for
presidential nomination, was admitted on the same day, the report exclaimed:
The most visionary prophets of the last decade would scarcely have ventured
to predict that a negro upon motion of a woman, who is a qualified counselor
before that court, would have been enrolled among the counselors of the
Supreme Court of the United States together with a democratic candidate
for the presidency.
See (1880) 16 CAN. L.J. 160.
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about women as lawyers which masks latent fears about potential changes
implicit in the end of male exclusivity in the legal profession.
The tone of editorial writing in Canada became more pointed in
1892 when Clara Brett Martin sought admission as a solicitor in Ontario.
One writer suggested that it would be difficult for her to qualify because
"there is no way of compelling a solicitor to article clerks. . . and without
office training it would be useless to attempt to qualify as a solicitor."58
The writer conceded, however, that she might qualify by attendance at
the Law School (Osgoode Hall), but suggested that:
Here the position is still embarrassing. One can hardly imagine the grave
and staid principal lecturing to a bevy of ladies on the inability of married
women to contract, the measure of damages in breach of promise cases,
the very grave necessity for corroborating their own oaths as to the promise,
the mysteries of 'the Clitheroe case', and sundry other matters peculiar to
themselves and their gentle sex. Equally awkward will it be for the Real
Property lecturer to explain the origin and varieties of estates tail, the limits
of the rule against perpetuities, the requisites of an estate by the cour-
tesy. . .. 59
The writer also noted, with some relief, that "the Bar is still closed,
however. ... "60
Six months later, the same journal presented an editorial note on
the Benchers' decision to admit women as solicitors, reporting that the
decision had been achieved by a vote of 12 to 11, and criticizing the
Benchers for making a decision on such "an extensive and radical question
of politics" without a vote of the profession generally. The strength of
feeling against the Benchers' decision is evident in the concluding words
of the note:
We feel confident that the good sense of the Profession is against the measure.
To argue that many women practise law in the United States is of no avail.
Monkeys are mimetic. Men should act upon reason and judgment. 61
A month later, the editor of the WESTERN LAW TIMES echoed these views,
suggesting that if women were suited to be solicitors, there was no reason
to prevent their admission as barristers, or their appointment as judges
or election as legislators, or to question their fitness to serve on juries.
58 (1892) 12 CAN. L.T. 111 at 112.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 (1892) 12 CAN. L.T. 296 at 297. The same journal includes short reports about
the legislative action and the problems with the wording of the amendment. See also
at 219-220.
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"The truth of course is that they are not fitted for any of these positions"
asserted the editorial. 62
These sentiments reoccurred with force when the Ontario legislature
amended its legislation again to permit the Law Society to make rules
for the admission of women as barristers. Because "admission to the Bar
means a qualification for the Bench", an editorial in the CANADA LAW
JOURNAL in 1895 suggested that it was inappropriate for women to be
barristers. To allow women to become barristers but prevent them from
seeking appointments to the Bench was "unreasonable", so the only
"legitimate way of keeping women off the Bench is by excluding them
from the Bar."63 In this way, the editorial writer answered his own rhe-
torical question: "Is the public prepared to see, and is it in the public
interest that it should see, female judges on the Bench?" 64
In February 1897, however, the CANADA LAW JOURNAL, gallantly
rising to the occasion, published a congratulatory note to Clara Brett
Martin on her call to the Bar of Ontario. The note expressed some
diffidence about whether to refer to her as "brother" or "sister", but
wished her success in "her chosen profession." 65 Yet, consistent with the
earlier concerns of the journal's editorial writers, the note also stated:
At the same time it will not be disloyal to her as now one of the brethren
of the gown, also to express the hope that she may be the one brilliant
exception to the time-honoured rule which has hitherto closed our ranks to
those who are not of the male persuasion. 66
Despite the wish that Clara Brett Martin would be a "brilliant
exception", other women in Ontario also chose to become lawyers. Their
numbers were initially small, leading one commentator in 1918 to express
the view that "[t]he admission of women to the practice of law has had
in Ontario no effect upon the Bar or the courts; the public and all concerned
regard it with indifference .. ."67 In a note in the CANADIAN LAW TIMES
62 (1893) 4 W.L.T. 1 at 1-2. In a subsequent issue, the same journal inserted a
comment on the report of Ontario's decision which appeared in the LONDON LAW
JOURNAL. The LONDON LAW JOURNAL had reported that the decision to admit women
as lawyers in Ontario had occurred "with the largest majority yet recorded." The editor's
note in the WESTERN LAW TIMES asserted that:
The expression the 'largest majority yet recorded' is most misleading. The
resolution was carried by the casting vote of the chairman, practically under
duress, and against the wishes, we firmly believe, of the overwhelming
majority of the legal profession in our sister province.
See (1893) 4 W.L.T. 30.
63 (1895) 31 CAN. L.J. 253 at 254.
64 Ibid.
65 (1897) 33 CAN. L.J. 133.
6 Ibid.
67 William Renwick Riddell, Women as Practitioners ofLaw (1918) 18 J. COMPAR.
LEGISLATION 200 at 205. This article contains an excellent summary of the process by
which Clara Brett Martin was admitted as a lawyer in Ontario, as well as details about
some of the early women lawyers in Ontario and in the United States.
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about this article's conclusion, however, the editor suggested that "[p]erhaps
the vigilance of the male lawyers has something to do with the failure
of the ladies to create a revolution in the profession. . . [since] male
barristers have pursued and married three out of the eight ladies on the
books of the Law Society of Upper Canada." 68
Thus, just as the judges in the admission cases began their legal
analysis with the idea that the legal profession was male only and that
women were not suited to its demands, so the writers in the law journals
expressed their preference (both vehemently and more light-heartedly)
for the retention of a male legal profession. Moreover, the views of these
writers of legal editorials are helpful in illustrating the broader social
context, within which judges considered the claims of women for ad-
mission as lawyers, and in explaining the reasons for theirjudicial choices.
"Invisible" behind their legal arguments and other comments was a
fundamental acceptance of different roles for men and women, and a
clear understanding that the legal profession's male exclusivity was "founded
in the divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things". 69
Thus, ideas about differentiated gender roles provide the key to
understanding these cases about the admission of women to the legal
profession. The challenge to male exclusivity in the legal profession
occurred within a context of industrial change that, particularly after
World War I, provided new opportunities for women for paid work.70
At the same time, however, ideas about "separate spheres" remained
prevalent, especially among upper and middle class professionals in-
cluding lawyers and judges. 7' As is evident in the comments in Langstaff's
case, judges were acutely aware of new roles for women at the same
time that they dismissed them as exceptional in the face of wartime needs.
Just as in philosophy the idea of separate spheres for men and women
was expressed as the distinction between the public and the private,72 so
in law it reinforced the idea that the legal profession was "for men only".
In early twentieth century Canada, the idea of "lawyer" was male,
both in legal theory and in the ideas of most members of society; and
since women were not male, it was incomprehensible that they should
be lawyers. For this reason also, the male standard of the idea of "lawyer"
6S (1919) 39 CAN. L.T. 223.
69 Mr. Justice Barker in In re French, supra, note 4 at 365, quoting Bradwell v.
Illinois, supra, note 20.
70 See, e.g. G.S. Lowe, Women, Work and the Office: The Feminization of Clerical
Occupations in Canada, 1901-1931 in V. Strong-Boag and A.C. Fellman, RETHINKING
CANADA: THE PROMISE OF WOMEN'S HISTORY (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986) at
107.
71 Constance Backhouse has demonstrated how lawyers and judges distinguished
the roles of women in the context of enforcing statutes about prostitution and rape. See
e.g., C. Backhouse, Nineteenth-Century Canadian Rape Law 1800-1892 in D.H. Flah-
erty, ed., ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAv, vol. 2 (Toronto: The Osgoode
Society, 1983) 200.
72 See e.g., J.B. Elshtain, PuBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN (Princeton, N.J.: Prin-
ceton Univ. Press, 1981).
1988]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
was used as the basis for the amending statutes enacted in both New
Brunswick and British Columbia, both of which provided for the ad-
mission of women "on the same terms as men".73 In this way, the leg-
islative amendments confirmed that the idea of lawyer was male at the
same time that they permitted women who conformed to the "male
lawyer" standard to be admitted to the legal profession. In such a context,
the admission of women to the legal profession in Canada represented
a formidable challenge to male exclusivity in the profession, but one
which did not fundamentally challenge the existing male standard of
lawyering. Women succeeded in becoming lawyers in Canada, but only
by failing to overcome the "invisible" structures of patriarchy.74
Ill. WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Despite these inauspicious beginnings for women lawyers, however,
much had changed for women in the legal profession by the 1980's. By
1987, for example, there were over 3500 women who were current
members of the legal profession in Ontario, representing about 18.6%
of the total number of lawyers in the province.75 Moreover, since law
schools had experienced a significant increase in the number of women
applicants over the preceding two decades, close to 50% of law school
entry classes in Ontario in 1987 were women. 76 On the basis of such
equality in numbers, most observers might readily agree with the opti-
mism of a comment written several decades earlier:
The time will come in the not too distant future when women will win equal
distinction with men in every phase of the practice of law.77
1. The Current Status of Women Lawyers in Canada:
Yet, there is already some evidence that this confident assertion may
prove misleading. Both in Canada and in the United States, women
lawyers appear to be less well-represented in the prestigious and highly-
73 Supra, note 5.
74 Supra, note 1.
75 According to the records of the Law Society of Upper Canada, there were
19,441 members in good standing (that is, excluding deceased, suspended, and disbarred
members) on June 30, 1987 and 3625 of those were women. See LSUC computer
printouts: analysis of members by sex and status.
76 In January 1986, the Globe and Mail reported that the first year class at the
University of Windsor included more than 50% women for the first time, while the
entrance rates for women at other common law schools in Canada hovered "around 35
to 45%". See M. Strauss, "Women law students outnumber the men at Windsor faculty"
Globe and Mail (January 29, 1986) at A16. The report also noted that the civil law
universities had admitted more women than men to their first year programs for a number
of years, l'Universit6 de Laval, since 1979 and l'Universit6 de Montreal, since 1981.
77 These words were written by Mary Appleby, then a student at Osgoode Hall
Law School, in the student newspaper Obiter Dicta in 1934.
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paid sectors of the legal profession.78 In the hearings before the ABA
Commission on Women in the Legal Profession in 1988, for example:
[Sleveral witnesses emphasized the great strides women have made in en-
tering and succeeding in the profession, [but] most participants at the hear-
ings expressed frustration and disillusionment that the barriers are still great
and that progress has been far slower than expected. Witnesses cautioned
that we must not be lulled into complacency about the status of women in
the profession simply because the numbers of women entering the profession
continue to increase.79
Similarly, in their study of lawyers in Toronto, Hagan, Huxter and Parker
concluded that women were disproportionately represented in the lower
levels of the legal profession in subordinate positions with little autonomy
in their work.8o Although there is still relatively little data because of the
recent entry of large numbers of women to the profession, the study
concluded that women had almost as great a chance as men to reach the
top of the profession but that there were significant disparities of rep-
78 A recent poll of lawyers in Canada disclosed that 57% of lawyers believed that
women are discriminated against in their law offices; and 71% believed that most
allegations of discrimination in law offices are substantiated. See "Gender Discrimi-
nation: A Tricky Question" Canadian Lawyer (March 1988) 8. The report of the poll
included comments from an Edmonton lawyer who stated that "an Alberta justice has
been overheard as saying that the 'experiment' of having women in the profession was
a failure and they should now return to the kitchen."
79 (Emphasis added) "Summary of Hearings, ABA Commission on Women in
the Profession" (February 1988) at 2 [hereinafter Summary of Hearings]. For further
information on women in the legal profession in the United States, see the special report
on Women in Law: the Glass Ceiling in A.B.A.J. (June 1988).
80 J. Hagan, M. Huxter and P. Parker, Class Structure and Legal Practice: Ine-
quality and Mobility among Toronto Lawyers (Unpublished paper, 1987). This study
characterized working conditions in terms of capitalists and working class categories.
According to this characterization, the authors concluded:
Women are significantly and disproportionately under-represented among
the managerial bourgeoisie, the supervisory bourgeoisie, and small em-
ployers, while they are significantly and disproportionately over-represented
among semiautonomous employees, workers and the surplus population. If
the latter three classes are combined, 61.8 per cent of the women are
included, as compared to 32.5 per cent of the men. So women are about
twice as likely as men to be found in this combined 'underclass'.
This conclusion is not unlike that reached by Barry Adam and Kathleen Lahey in their
earlier study of the graduates of Ontario law schools in 1974. See B. Adam and K.
Lahey, Professional Opportunities: A Survey of the Ontario Legal Profession (1981) 59
CAN. BAR REV. 674. The demography of the Canadian legal profession is also reviewed
in H. Arthurs, R. Weisman and F. Zemans, Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Profession-
alism in R. Abel and P. Lewis, eds, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, vol. 1, THE COMMON LAW
WORLD, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 123, at 133. The authors briefly
summarize some information about women in the profession, concluding that women
are not found "in proportionate numbers in all types of practices".
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resentation by gender at the lower end of the profession.81 Moreover,
even for those women who reached the higher levels of the profession,
the study results showed that they did "not benefit as much in their
earnings as [did] men when they practice[d] in traditionally male areas,
when they gain[ed] experience, or when they [became] partners in firms."82
These findings are similar to the results of a national study of lawyers'
earnings in Canada.8 3 Based on census figures for 1971 and 1981, the
study showed that in 1981, female lawyers were five years younger, on
average, than male lawyers, but that a much smaller percentage of female
lawyers were married, with larger proportions either divorced, separated
or single.84 Over one-half of the female lawyers were salaried, compared
with thirty per cent of the males, and a larger percentage of female
lawyers practised in cities.85
In comparisons of earnings, moreover, the study found that male
lawyers earned more than female lawyers: for 1980, female lawyers in
private practice earned an average of $24,509 while male lawyers earned
an average of $42,405.86 These numbers must be further assessed, of
course, to take account of the younger ages of female lawyers as a result
of their more recent entry to the profession. However, even comparisons
of lawyers by age groups in this study showed that the earnings of female
lawyers started at a lower level ($22,000 at age 30 in 1980) and rose
much more slowly than did the earnings of male lawyers:
Consequently, although female lawyers earn about 27 per cent ($8000) less
than male lawyers at age 30, the differential increases to 37 per cent ($15,000)
by age 35, and to 39 per cent ($20,000) by age 40. The largest differential
(about $23,000) occurs at age 50.87
The study attempted to account for a number of variables which might
affect the differences in earnings of men and women lawyers, but con-
cluded that there was an "earnings differential" of approximately $9000
81 Hagan, et al., ibid. The study measured the proportion of men and women in
the "working class" of the profession from entry to six years, and then from six to
eleven years of practice. Up to six years, 56.7% of women and 43.3% of men worked
in the working class category; after six years of practice, 23.5% of women remained
in the working class, compared to 13.5% of the men. As the study also demonstrated,
"Women relative to men lawyers are significantly and disproportionately in the surplus
population, both before (2.4 compared to 9.8%) and after (1.6 compared to 9.3%) the
six year break-point." Ibid. at 24.
82 J. Hagan, "Highlights from a Study of Toronto Lawyers" (CBAO Annual
Institute, Program on Women in the Legal Profession: February 1988), at 2.
83 D. Stager and D.K. Foot, Earnings and Employment of Female Lawyers (Un-
published: 1987). An excellent summary of surveys and information sources on lawyers
in Canada is found in D. Stager, STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON LAWYERS IN CANADA
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1986).
84 Stager and Foot, ibid. at 6.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. at 8.
87 Ibid. at 8-9.
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(in 1980) which was not explained by the variables in the model. The
authors agreed with another commentator who had noted that:
[A]lthough this residual has traditionally been called discrimination, it is
really 'a measure of our ignorance', and that the male/female differential
is 'a complex matter that yields its secrets only grudgingly'. 88
The disadvantaged position of women lawyers in Canada is similar
to that in other jurisdictions. In a comparative study of lawyers in several
different countries, 89 Richard Abel found that there were cross-cultural
similarities in the high rate of women's entry to the profession over the
past two decades, 90 and also in the difficulties experienced in obtaining
apprenticeship positions and permanent employment,91 and in disparities
88 Ibid. at 12, referring to R.K. Filer, Sexual Differences in Earnings: The Role
of Individual Personalities and Tastes (1983) 19 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 408. In discussing
this aspect of discrimination, Stager and Foot, ibid. at 11, also acknowledged the
homogeneity of legal education and training, and the possibility that such homogeneity
may reduce other variables so as to permit the identification of sex discrimination in
the legal profession more readily than in some other occupational groupings. As they
stated:
Because the professional education and training of lawyers is more ho-
mogeneous than for most other major occupations, it is possible to examine
the male/female earnings differential for evidence of discrimination in a
setting where the occupation, industry and education variables are so nar-
rowly defined that sample heterogeneity can be greatly reduced.
The authors also suggest, at 13, that hours worked and field of work may have some
impact on the differential, although they were unable to be conclusive about this ex-
planation.
89 R.L. Abel, Comparative Sociology ofLegal Professions: An Exploratory Essay
(1985) 1 AMER. BAR FouND. REs. J. 5.
90 According to Abel, ibid. at 22, 23; "the number of male law students doubled
between 1962/63 and 1980/81 while the number of female students increased 24 times"
in the same period in Canada. The pattern of women's entry to the legal profession in
Canada after 1970 occurred in a number of other western countries at the same time,
in some cases even more dramatically. In the U.S.A., for example, Abel reported that
"male enrollment in law school actually declined at an average rate of 0.1% a year in
the 1970's, whereas female enrollment increased at an average annual rate of 41.4%.
Male entry to the profession also declined after 1973, and all further increases in the
rate of growth are attributable to new women lawyers." (Emphasis in original). For
details of similar statistics for other jurisdictions, see ibid.
9, Ibid. at 39. The author reported difficulties in a number of jurisdictions, in-
cluding Canada:
Decisions by lawyers to take on apprentices or hire new entrants are less
visible and centralized, allowing greater scope for the expression of pre-
judice. The fragmentary evidence strongly suggests that women are becom-
ing concentrated in positions that are less prestigious and remunerative, that
deal with personal plight, and that can be held part time.
For details of problems reported in other jurisdictions, see ibid. at 39-40.
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in income.92 After assessing the unequal position of women lawyers in
a number of different jurisdictions, Abel concluded:
It seems to be true almost universally that once the legal and sociocultural
barriers against women lawyers were removed, they entered the profession
in numbers approximating those of men. ... Yet once they leave the
meritocratic arena of formal education and examinations, they once again
encounter prejudice and role conflict. The result is that qualified women
lawyers fail to enter practice, leave early, or accept less attractive positions.
These forms of inequality will not change until there is a transformation of
the sexual division of labor.93
This disquieting conclusion is echoed in the recent work of Carrie
Menkle-Meadow, who has conducted cross-cultural research on women
in the legal profession, concentrating primarily on western industrialized
nations. 94 Significantly, she found that "women [were] disproportionately
located in different spheres of the profession in virtually every country,"
but that they were uniformly found in the "lowest echelons" of the
profession in each country (although what constituted the lowest echelons
varied from one country to another). 95 In light of these findings, she
warned that it is not appropriate to assume that increased numbers of
92 Abel, ibid. at 40, attributed women lawyers' lower earnings to their lack of
representation in the hierarchy of work in the legal profession, and provided statistics
demonstrating the income differentials for a number of jurisdictions. As other com-
mentators, however, he noted the need to adjust the data for age.
93 Ibid. Abel recommended cross-cultural research on the impact of a substantial
minority of women in the profession for the first time in history. Indeed, in another
article, he referred to the entry of women into the legal profession since 1970 as "nothing
short of revolutionary". See R. Abel, The Contradictions of Professionalism in Abel
and Lewis, eds, supra, note 80 at 202-203. For further consideration of these ideas,
see also C. Menkle-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lawyering Process (1985) 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39; and Excluded Voices: New
Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law (1987) 42 U. MIAMI L.
R. 29.
Menkle-Meadow (and others) would, however, disagree with Abel's implicit sug-
gestion that law schools offer a "meritocratic arena of formal education and examina-
tions"; see C. Menkle-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and
Legal Education or 'The Fem-Crits Go to Law School' (1988) 38 J. OF LEGAL ED. 61,
and other articles in that issue devoted to "Women in Legal Education - Pedagogy,
Law, Theory, and Practice". In Canada, see C. Boyle, Teaching Law as if Women Really
Mattered, or, What About the Washrooms? (1986) 2 C.J.W.L. 96; and M. O'Brien and
S. McIntyre, Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education (1986) 2 C.J.W.L. 69.
4 C. Menkle-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The 'Fem-
inization' of the Legal Profession (1987) 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 897; and CBAO Annual
Institute, Program on Women in the Legal Profession: February 1988. For information
on lawyers in Third World nations, see R. L. Abel, The Underdevelopment of Legal
Professions: Review Article on Third World Lawyers, (1982) AMER. BAR REs. FOUND.
J. 871.
95 Menkle-Meadow, ibid. at 907-908; CBAO Annual Institute ibid. at 15.
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women entering the profession will necessarily result in equality of op-
portunities for women; instead, she recommended that:
[W]e must examine the meaning of the entrance of women into the legal
profession from more than the perspective of quantitative sociology. As we
collect data and observe gender differences in location and type of practice,
favoured tasks, and specialities, we should be prepared to examine the
transformative potential of these social facts. 96
2. Beyond Increased Numbers - "Invisible" Structural Barriers:
In assessing the "transformative potential" of these social facts about
women in the legal profession, it is helpful to consider recent literature
which analyzes barriers to women's achievement of leadership roles in
other societal contexts. In the context of theories about the sociology of
organizations, for example, Rosabeth Moss Kanter has written extensively
of the structural constraints within organizations which systematically
exclude from promotion and advancement all those who are not "like"
existing leaders in the organization.97
In her major study of the organizational structure of a large American
corporation in the 1970's, Moss Kanter identified a number of features
analogous to those of a modem law firm. For example, in her study of
managerial roles in the corporation, she characterized tasks to be per-
formed on the basis of whether they were "routine" or whether they
required the exercise of discretion; as she reported, wherever discretionary
decision-making was required within the corporate structure, the organ-
izational response was to ensure homogeneity of personnel, in order to
eliminate at least one aspect of uncertainty:98
96 Menkle-Meadow, ibid. at 918. This conclusion mirrors that of the ABA Com-
mission on Women in the Profession. In its Summary of Hearings, the Commission
noted "the persistence of gender discrimination in the legal profession", and emphasized
the need to recognize that the increased numbers of women entering the legal profession
had not yet resulted in the removal of frustrations and barriers for women. See supra,
note 79.
97 R. Moss Kanter, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (New York: Basic
Books, 1977). See also Moss Kanter, Reflections on Women and the Legal Profession:
A Sociological Perspective (1978) 1 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1; and Structuring the Inside:
The Impact of Organizations on Sex Differences in B. Forisha and B. Goldman, OuT-
SIDERS ON THE INSIDE (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981) 75.
98 See Moss Kanter, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION, ibid. at 47ff. As
defined by Moss Kanter:
Uncertainty can stem from either the time-span of decisions and the amount
of information that must be collected, or from the frequency with which
non-routine events occur and must be handled. The impossibility of spec-
ifying contingencies in advance, operating procedures for all possible events,
leaves an organization to rely on personal discretion. (It is also this pressure
that partly accounts for the desire to centralize responsibility in a few people
who can be held accountable for discretionary decisions.)
Ibid. at 52.
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The uncertainty up the ranks. . . puts trust and homogeneity at a premium.
The personal loyalty normally demanded of subordinates by officials is most
intense at the highest levels of organizations. . . . The lack of structure in
top jobs makes it very important for decision-makers to work together closely
in at least the harmony of shared understanding and a degree of mutual
trust. ... [T]he solidarity that can be mustered through common mem-
bership in social networks, and the social control this provides, is a helpful
supplement for decision-makers. 99
According to Moss Kanter, because the corporate response to discre-
tionary decision-making was to choose new senior managers who were
most "like" existing senior managers, the "more closed the circle, the
more difficult it [was] for 'outsiders' to break in." 100
Moss Kanter also examined the idea of power in the corporation
and its effect on men and women.' 0 ' She documented the expressed
preferences of both men and women employees to work for male man-
agers, rather than for female ones, because male managers were more
readily perceived to be part of the power structure of the organization.
"[I]n the context of organizations where women do not have access to
the same opportunities for power and efficacy through activities or al-
liances",102 the employees' expressed preference for men was clearly a
preference for power. This structural barrier also affected women's abil-
ities to achieve leadership roles within the organization.
Nonetheless, despite such barriers, a few women in Moss Kanter's
study did succeed in becoming senior managers of the corporation. Her
99 Ibid. at 53. Moss Kanter expressly noted the need for "homogeneity of class
and ethnic background and prior social experiences" in relation to this comment; she
applied it more specifically to women in Part HI of her book.
loo Ibid. at 68.
101 Her definition of power as "the ability to get things done, to mobilize resources,
to get and use whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she is attempting
to meet" is suggestive of power in a hierarchical setting. However, she also refers to
power as a means of "empowering more people through generating more autonomy,
more participation in decisions, and more access to resources", a definition which results
in increasing the total capacity for effective action rather than for domination. Ibid. at
166.
See also R. Moss Kanter, Changing the Shape of Work: Reform in Academe, in
PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP (Washington D.C.: American Ass'n for Higher Education,
1979) 3. The idea of power has also been examined by a number of feminists: see e.g.,
J. Jaquette, Power as Ideology: A Feminist Analysis, in J. Stier, ed., WOMEN'S VIEwS
OFTHE POLITICAL WORLD OF MEN (Dobb's Ferry, N.Y: Transnational, 1982) 9; N.C.M.
Hartsock, Political Change: Two Perspectives on Power in BUILDING FEMINIST THEORY
ESSAYS FROM QUEST (New York: Longman, 1981) 3; T. McCormack, Toward a Nonsexist
Perspective on Social and Political Change in M. Millman and R. Moss Kanter, eds,
ANOTHER VOICE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (Garden
City, N.Y: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975) 1; I.E. Deutchman, Socialization to Power:
Questions about Women and Politics, (1986) 5:4 WOMEN AND PoLrrICs 79; and A.
Duffy, Reformulating Power for Women (1986) 23 CAN. REv. SOC. AND ANTH. 22.
102 Moss Kanter, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION, supra, note 97 at 199-
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assessment of these "token" women of the corporation, numerically small
by comparison with men who were senior managers, offers an interesting
analogy to the position of those few women who are currently in senior
positions within the legal profession. Moss Kanter identified the pro-
portional representation of male and female workers in the corporation
using a scale of participation rates from "dominant" to "token" repre-
sentation. On this scale, she classified as "skewed" those groups with a
large preponderance of one type over another, up to a ratio of about
85:15; in such a situation the numerically smaller group were likely to
be "tokens" and the larger group "dominants". By comparison, in "tilted"
groups with a ratio of about 65:35, dominants became just a "majority"
while tokens became a "minority". Only at a ratio of 60:40 to 50:50
would a group be considered "balanced".
In Moss Kanter's analysis, the significance of different ratios for
groups within organizations was their effect on the behaviour of indi-
viduals within the groups. In particular, Moss Kanter identified the serious
effect on "tokens", the numerical minority within "skewed" groups, who
suffered the double difficulty of invisibility in terms of their individual
characteristics and at the same time the ascription of the general char-
acteristics of "all women": "tokens can never really be seen as they are,
and they are always fighting stereotypes . .. -103 As Moss Kanter con-
cluded, "People's treatment, then, is not automatically fixed by inflexible
characteristics but depends on their numbers in a particular situation." 104
Thus, the structural constraints of roles, power and numbers sig-
nificantly affected the position of men and women in the corporation.
What appeared to be "sex differences" in the roles of men and women
in the corporation were, according to Moss Kanter's analysis, the result
of structural features of corporate organization. Concluding, moreover,
that individual-based initiatives would never overcome these structural
barriers, she recommended systematic structural change within the cor-
poration: "batch" rather than one-by-one hiring of women managers; the
deliberate creation of role models for women managers; opportunities
for networking by women managers; more flexible organizational struc-
tures; better education of corporate leaders about tokenism; and support
programs for women. 105
The existence of structural, systemic barriers constraining women's
opportunities for advancement within the corporation led Moss Kanter
to conclude that such changes were likely to occur only as a result of
103 Ibid. at 230.
104 Ibid. at 241. For details of the stresses and costs to tokens, see generally ibid.
at 212-240.
1o Ibid. at 281-283.
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"outside intervention". 10 6 This conclusion has frequently occurred in stud-
ies of women's roles in other contexts such as political activism. In a
cross-cultural study of women in politics designed to analyze reasons for
women's disproportionately small representation in the political process
(relative to their numbers in the population), Cynthia Fuchs Epstein 07
identified a range of factors frequently cited to explain women's under-
representation in "the ranks of the elite": women's "inherent incapacity"
to be assertive and dominant; social factors which "direct women away
from the public sphere to family-centred activities"; time problems and
role strains flowing from "women's sex-role-associated duties"; the lack
of "opportunity structures" for women to acquire appropriate skills; and
others. 108
For Epstein, these and other factors constitute a system for dis-
couraging and disempowering women from seeking access to power and
elites. Suggesting that positive intervention to assist women is necessary,
she argued that the dominance of men in politics has remained essentially
unchallenged because it has been regarded as "natural":
Some groups object to programs that guarantee women and other minorities
a chance for better access to elite positions. Yet, in the past, elite gatekeepers
were effective in maintaining existing hierarchies - in sifting and sorting
out unwanted groups. These were seen as 'natural' processes rather than
as programs. Perhaps this is because the maintenance of systems, which
require attention and input to keep them going, does not attract as much
notice as the alteration of systems. Thus, because men have been successful
in maintaining their domination of women, little notice has been taken of
the methods used to maintain that dominance.0 9
Both the analysis of Moss Kanter and that of Epstein focus on
"invisible" barriers which impede women's access to power and lead-
ership roles. Despite some differences in their analyses, both studies
identify systemic features in organizational structures which deter or
prevent women from succeeding as men do. Such a structural analysis
is helpful in understanding the current position of women as lawyers
106 Ibid. at 260ff. Moss Kanter was not overly optimistic about change occurring
from within because of the structural features of the corporation itself:
[A]s long as the steep multi-leveled hierarchies that tend to accompany
large size remain, it is impossible to remedy many inequities of compensation
or opportunity, let alone empower more people or share decision-making
more widely. When the model is hierarchical rather than collegial, there
would also appear to be real limits on the extent to which it is possible to
expand anyone's power, other than for those people who already have the
managerial monopoly.
Ibid. at 286.
107 C.E Epstein, Women and Elites: A Cross-National Perspective in C.F. Epstein
and R.L. Coser, AccEss TO POWER: CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF WOMEN AND ELITES
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981) 3.
os Ibid. at 3-4. For further discussion, see ibid. at 5-15.
109 Ibid. at 6 (emphasis in original).
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since their numbers in the practising legal profession are still smallo
and their numbers in the higher echelons of large law firms are even
smaller. Visualizing the situation of women lawyers in structural terms
has some potential to depersonalize the issue of sex discrimination in the
profession and to permit a clear focus on systematic efforts to overcome
the problems of structural barriers to equality. As well, such an analysis
recognizes the need for systemic change, rather than individualized efforts
to assimilate to male standards; that is, while practising law like a man
may be of some limited use to women, there is a need for change in the
structure of law practice too.",
Particularly in the context of law, however, such a structural analysis
also has some limitations. Because its solutions depend on outside in-
tervention, it is unclear how such pressures will be forthcoming in a self-
regulating profession. The assumption of a political will "outside" the
profession which may demand such changes may be illusory at best.
Second, the focus on barriers also seems to assume that they can be
removed. In both cases, there is an underlying sense of rationality about
the issue of appropriate sex role divisions in society and their reflection
in the constraints experienced by women lawyers. In marked contrast to
such rationality about existing "separate spheres" for men and women,
however, it may be that there are less rational, but similarly "invisible",
constraints on the idea of leadership which make it difficult (even im-
possible) for women to achieve positions of leadership in the legal pro-
fession.
3. Lawyers and Leadership - "Invisible" Barriers in Ideas:
In the search for a rationale for "invisible" barriers for women in
the legal profession, it is also important to focus on the significance of
ideas about sex and sex roles in society. "Why . . . does one see the
world in the way that one does; and what factors contribute to one's
seeing it differently at another moment in time?"12 How do our ideas
1o The 18.6% of the profession who were women in 1987 would represent Moss
Kanter's "tilted" category; but it is only a few years since the percentage of women
lawyers has been more than 15%, the ratio below which the category would have been
"skewed". See supra, notes 75-76 and text accompanying note 104.
111 There is a rich literature about the roles of men and women in organizations,
and the effects of socialization on their behavior patterns: See e.g., the bibliographical
material in the section on organizations in M. Jarrard and P. Randall, WOMAN SPEAKING:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION (New
York: Garland, 1982).
112 S. Farganis, SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FEMININE CHARACTER (Totawa,
N.Y.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986) at 25-26. Farganis offers an analysis of the sociology
of knowledge focused on Viola Klein's THE FEMININE CHARACTER, a book concerned
"with the relationship between writings about women and the social conditions out of
which these writings are fashioned and within which they are placed." According to
Farganis, at 9, "Perception, determined by the times in which one lives, changes as
reality is reordered, which reordering is itself a consequence of the acceptance of new
ideas." Farganis also considered the work of Mannheim, Kuhn, and Marx (among others)
in relation to her thesis.
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about men and women (and prevailing notions of activities appropriate
to each of them) affect our perceptions of their differences and potential
abilities? In her study of the social reconstruction of "the feminine char-
acter", Sondra Farganis stated succinctly the view of those who assert
that the male/female duality of our society operates negatively for women:
Certain terms in Western discourse... have been gendered: men have been
seen as public persons, as reasonable, as persons of intellect and persons
with a culture; women have been seen as private persons, irrational or
passionate, as persons of the body and persons in line with nature, as persons
in a culture. One must think past these false categories and begin to redefine
terms like power and reason: one must conceptualize the former in terms
that encourage persons to think in terms of power to not power over. ... 113
If we regard sex roles as socially constructed by our experiences, rather
than objective in their origins and formulations, it is possible to contem-
plate as well the idea of leadership as one defined by our experiences of
those who have always been leaders: men.
In a number of recent studies of leadership, researchers have iden-
tified differences between men and women, both in their outward styles
of leadership and in their self-perceptions as leaders." 4 Chapman re-
ported, for example, on Megargee's study of the influence of sex roles
on the manifestation of leadership.1 5 In his study in 1969, Megargee
paired persons who had previously been tested to determine their degrees
of dominance. When "high dominance" men and women were paired
with persons of the same sex, 75% of high dominance men and 70% of
high dominance women took the leadership role in the tasks assigned.
When high dominance men were paired with low dominance women,
90% of the men assumed the leadership role, but when high dominance
women were paired with low dominance men, only 20% of the women
assumed a leadership role.116
As Chapman noted, the research results suggested that "society does
not expect women to express dominance, particularly in situations where
women are required to interact with men in order to accomplish specified
goals." Moreover, if women feel reluctance about expressing themselves
as leaders, their default probably reinforces the assumptions (of both men
"3 Ibid. at 193; Farganis attributed these ideas to A.M. Jaggar, Towards a More
Integrated World, (Unpublished paper presented to the Douglass College Women's
Studies Seminar, January 1985).
114 M. Loden, FEMININE LEADERSHIP (New York: Times Books, 1985); M. Mac-
coby, THE LEADER (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981); and J.B. Chapman, Male
and Female Leadership Styles: The Double Bind in J. Ramaley, ed., COVERT DISCRIM-
INATION AND WOMEN IN THE SCIENCES (Colorado: Western Press for Amer. Assoc. of
Advancement of Sciences, 1978) 97. My special thanks to Cheryl Kristjanson for sharing
with me her research and ideas on women and leadership.
15 E.I. Megargee, Influence of Sex Roles on the Manifestation of Leadership
(1969) 53 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 377; quoted by Chapman, ibid. at 102.
116 Megargee, ibid.
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and women) "that women are incapable of effective leadership within
an organization".117 The same conclusion appeared in a book published
at about the same time, in which a leading management theorist described
the model of the successful manager in our culture as "a masculine one",
describing him as "aggressive, competitive, firm, [and] just" and not
"feminine ... soft or yielding or dependent or intuitive in the womanly
sense."' 18 Moreover, in such a context, women leaders may often face
a "double bind":
[I]f the female manager adopts accommodative leadership behaviors...
she will be criticized for being 'motherly', indecisive, or weak. Conversely,
if she adopts task-oriented behaviors, she will be criticized for being pushy,
unfeminine and temperamental. Faced with this lose-lose conflict, the woman
leader, in all likelihood, will experience extreme frustration and resort to a
fairly passive existence in the organization, accepting her role as a mere
transient in the mainstream of organizational leadership." 9
Thus, the conflict for women between expectations based on their
roles as women and those related to male models of leadership presents
some difficulties for women seeking leadership roles within organizations.
In the context of women lawyers, such conflicts were specifically iden-
tified in the hearings of the ABA Task Force on Women in the Legal
Profession:
Witnesses expressed their belief that women must still work harder and be
better than men in order to be recognized and succeed. Individuals also
testified that women walk a fine line between being regarded as too feminine
(and thus not tough, lawyerlike or smart) or too tough (and thus unfeminine
or not the kind of woman male colleagues feel comfortable relating to). 1 20
At the same time, however, the appropriateness of male models of lead-
ership has also been increasingly challenged, particularly by feminists
who suggest that there are more appropriate "female" qualities of lead-
ership. In the work of Nancy Hartsock 2 l and Carol Gilligan, 122 for ex-
ample, women's knowledge and experiences are examined and legiti-
17 Ibid. In this article, Chapman reviewed a number of older studies about sex
roles and behaviour, including V.E. Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Ster-
eotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics (1973) 57 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 95;
and I.D. Steiner and E.D. Rogers, Alternative Responses to Dissonance (1963) 66 J.
OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 128. See also N.J. Adler and D. Izraeli, WOMEN IN
MANAGEMENT WORLDWIDE (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988).
118 D. McGregor, THE PROFaSSIONAL MANAGER (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967)
at 23; as quoted in Chapman, supra, note 114 at 105. For a different perspective, see
Adler and Izraeli, ibid.
"9 Chapman, supra, note 114 at 110.
120 Summary of Hearings, supra, note 79, at 3-4.
121 N.C.M. Hartsock, MONEY, SEX AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL
MATERIALISM (New York: Longman, 1983).
122 C. Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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mated as different from, and sometimes superior to, those of men:
"[women's] ways are not only different but better ... in the sense of
liberating or negating a contrary male way of being that is competitive
rather than cooperative, authoritative rather than democratic, life-denying
rather than life-giving ..... 123 In such a context, the concept of lead-
ership is dramatically transformed to one of "empowerment of others"
rather than "power over others".
Regardless of the model of leadership that is adopted, however,
societal ideas of appropriate sex roles for men and women present "in-
visible" constraints for women who aspire to leadership. Because most
previous experience of leadership has been male, women who want to
become leaders must often demonstrate both that they can provide lead-
ership on the male model and also that they are able to offer leadership
in ways which are different from, and superior to, the male model of
leadership. In doing so, women must demonstrate their ability to "assim-
ilate" the male model of leadership at the same time as they demonstrate
how their own qualities of leadership are in fact preferable. In both cases,
however, the existing male model remains the standard, either as the
measure of women's conformity or the extent of their differences.
In the context of women in the legal profession, the importance of
these comments is their implicit recognition of the maleness of societal
ideas about leadership. Although women have finally succeeded in be-
coming lawyers in ever increasing numbers, the "invisible" constraints
of male leadership models have made them markedly less successful in
becoming leaders in the profession. Because of the social construction
of the idea of leadership on a male model, few women are perceived as
leaders and those who achieve leadership do so only by accepting the
male standard of leadership. In such a context, "thinking like a man" is
a high compliment only if women lawyers deny that they have anything
to offer as leaders in the profession which is different from the qualities
of leadership offered by men.
What process is needed to transform the legal profession, only
recently emerging from its male exclusivity, to a profession which wel-
comes and values essentially "female" qualities? If "[w]hat the feminine
has come to mean is a result of a socially arrived at definition, made
legitimate as a consequence of the power and influence of those in a
position to define it",124 what is needed to transform our ideas about
female qualities of power and influence? As Menkle-Meadow has sug-
gested, can we move beyond the question of increasing numbers of women
lawyers - the question of quantitative sociology - to an exploration
of "the transformative potential" of the social facts about women in the
legal profession?125
123 Farganis, supra, note 112 at 174; citing Hartsock, supra, note 121; and Jaggar,
supra, note 113.
124 Farganis, ibid. at 196.
12 Menkle-Meadow, CBAO Annual Institute, supra, note 94 at 30.
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IV. WOMAN LAWYERS: TOWARD "TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL"
I think all lawyers must agree
On keeping our profession free
From females whose admission would
Result in anything but good.
Because it yet has to be shown
That men are fit to hold their own
In such a contest, I've no doubt
We'd some of us be crowded out. 126
When this verse was published almost one hundred years ago, women
were not permitted to practice as lawyers anywhere in the British Empire.
In less than 100 years, women in Canada have successfully challenged
the male exclusivity of the legal profession, losing initially in all three
court cases but gaining the right to practise in all the provinces as a result
of legislative action. Since 1970, moreover, increasing numbers of women
have chosen to seek careers as lawyers so that, for the first time in history
in Canada, the legal profession faces a problem - and an opportunity
- because it is no longer an exclusively male profession, either in law
or in terms of numbers. 127 Yet, the issue still to be resolved is the role
for women in the profession: whether women will become leaders only
by assimilation to male standards of lawyering, or whether, on the other
hand, the nature of practice and of leadership will be transformed by
their presence. In this sense, the moment of reckoning has arrived.
Both Moss Kanter's structural analysis of organizations and research
on the social construction of sex roles offer useful ways of understanding
the "invisible" barriers preventing women lawyers' achievement of lead-
ership roles in the legal profession at the end of the twentieth century.
Structural analysis suggests the need for systemic changes, "outside"
intervention and organizational strategies to increase the numbers of
women in leadership roles and to ensure their access to power in such
roles. Theories about the social construction of sex roles focus on the
126 As quoted by Mullins, supra, note 8 at 676; the author indicated that the poem
first appeared in Grip in 1892, according to R. Cook and W. Mitchinson, eds, THE
PROPER SPHERE: WOMEN'S PLACE IN CANADIAN SOCIETY (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1976) at 167.
127 Richard Abel has identified a number of demographic changes in the legal
profession, resulting in younger average ages as well as increased numbers of women.
He also has identified a "lag" in the numbers of ethnic law graduates, and has suggested
that:
These demographic shifts are of considerable importance. They reveal a
profession that still does not reflect the class or ethnic composition of
heterogeneous stratified societies. They reveal a substantial minority of
women occupying inferior positions. And they reveal a youthful profession
still governed almost exclusively by elderly males .... These tensions of
class, ethnicity, gender, and age pose acute problems for professional as-
sociations.
Supra, note 89 at 41.
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attitudes and behaviours of men and women in different situations and
suggest the need for education about stereotyping and positive role models
for both men and women in leadership positions.
While both these approaches offer assistance in understanding the
barriers to women's achievements in the legal profession reflective of
their increasing numbers, they differ in the extent to which they use male
achievements as the target for women's leadership ambitions. Structural
analysis suggests that an increase in the numbers of women exercising
leadership and power will enhance opportunities for individual women
but it does not necessarily challenge existing male models of leadership.
Theories of the social construction of sex roles, by contrast, require some
reflection about "inherent" and "learned" abilities and permit some as-
sessment of the extent to which leadership may be exercised in different
ways by men and by women. 128
This distinction is important, because it is fundamental to any strat-
egy for increasing women's leadership to decide whether, on one hand,
women must have opportunities to acquire male attributes of "leadership"
or whether, on the other hand, both men and women must learn to
recognize "leadership" talents expressed by women which are currently
invisible because they are different from expressions of leadership by
men. In the first case, the strategy assumes that women and men exercise
leadership in the same way, but women need to be assisted to learn the
skills of leadership through training, opportunities, role models, men-
toring, etc. In the second case, the strategy assumes that men and women
exercise leadership in different ways and perhaps for different purposes,
and that both individuals and organizations must be assisted to make
better use of the leadership talents already being exercised but currently
invisible. 129 The first strategy offers the possibility of increased oppor-
tunities and challenges for individual women in leadership positions while
the second promises a fundamental reconstruction of ideas about "suc-
cess" and "leadership" and the potential for transforming societal values
about them. As the report of the ABA Commission on Women in the
Legal Profession stated:
Several witnesses emphasized that the problems facing lawyers of both
sexes, but especially women, in trying to combine professional demands
128 See e.g., F.L. Denmark, Styles of Leadership (1977-78) 2 PSYCH. OF WOMEN
Q. 99; and A.R. Hauptman, Styles of Leadership: Power and Feminine Values in Forisha
and Goldman, eds, supra note 97 at 114.
129 In M. Rendel, The Death of Leadership or Educating People to Lead Them-
selves (1978) 1 WOMEN'S STUDIES Q. 313 at 318, it is asserted that:
We know that the achievements of men and women are perceived at different
levels, those of women being rated as the lower even when the achievement
is identical. This has been shown in a number of studies of the assessment
of women's and men's work and curricula vitae.
Rendel cited a number of studies, including Deaux and Emsmiller (1974); Fiddell
(1970); Lewin and Duchan (1971); and Simpson (1969).
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with important human relationships and children, involve questioning the
values and ethics of the profession. The concern is that, at a time when the
pressures are growing for law firms to be successful businesses and for
lawyers to produce even greater numbers of billable hours, lawyers are
being dehumanized, unable to relate to clients and family members.
Witnesses believe that lawyers will lose their sense of perspective
and ethics under the weight of pressures to produce billable hours and the
stress of cutting back on family involvement. These witnesses suggested
that women, by raising the crucial issues of family and workplace, can take
the lead in helping to restore sanity, balance, and respect to the profession.130
How will the "transformative potential of the social facts" about
women lawyers be expressed? In the Canadian context, some women in
the legal profession have achieved leadership positions by their (at least
outward) assimilation to the male model.131 Others have consciously
chosen different paths of leadership, deciding to work more cooperatively
and in less paternalistic relationships with clients, choices that represent
decisions to express their talents for initiative and responsibilty in ways
which reflect female rather than male models of professional work. 132
130 Summary of Hearings, supra, note 79, at 9. A recent survey of lawyers in
Quebec suggests that male lawyers as well as female lawyers are becoming more
concerned to balance their professional responsibilities and family life. See S. Barron,
Balancing Act (February 1989) NATIONAL 15.
'31 In the context of Moss Kanter's structural analysis, it is logical that male
hierarchies within the legal profession would choose to promote those women who are
most "like" them, i.e., assimilated to the male model. There is all too little information
about women who have achieved positions of leadership in the legal profession in Canada,
but two comments might be made. First, the demographic information in Stager and
Foot's research suggests that more women lawyers than men lawyers are unmarried,
and this data might suggest that such women are more easily able to fit the male model
of lawyer, i.e., a person without the significant family obligations which most women
are assumed to have. See supra, text accompanying note 83.
Second, a recent article in the CBA National about women judges suggested their
inability to identify with other women because "The very fact these women are judges
proves they have been professionally successful, and they may lack empathy with
homemakers. . . ." More specifically, Louise Lamb's comment, quoted in the article,
suggests the significance of the structural analysis in the context of women judges:
[Women judges] are drawn from a certain group, and feminist activity would
possibly be held against them. The judiciary is still very much a kind of
club.
C. McLeod, "Women Against Women: Female Judges Share Males' Myths and Mis-
conceptions" NATIONAL (October 1988) 16. In a subsequent issue of the NATIONAL
(December 1988) at 2, Louise Lamb explained in a letter to the editor that McLeod's
article had "misquoted and distorted" her comments, stating that "neither sex has a
monopoly on sensible and sensitive decisions regarding gender equality issues."
For some information on the success of women in achieving positions of leadership
in the profession, see Arthurs, et al., supra, note 80 at 133. They reported, for example,
that "Male judges and magistrates outnumbered female by more than eight to one in
1981 - more than nineteen to one on the federal bench."
132 See e.g., the report on the eight-woman law firm in Toronto formed because
"What we had in common is that we made similar decisions about how we want to
practice and how we want to live our lives." - A quote from Mary Dunbar in M.
Strauss, "How the Peanut Butter got on the Will" Globe and Mail, (26 January 1987)
B1.
1988]
Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa
For the present, however, it is women in the former group who are more
often seen as leaders by the profession and individual women continue
to experience difficulties when they fail to conform, however under-
standably, to the male model of lawyering.133
At such a moment in the history of women lawyers, it is possible
to assess both how much has been achieved and at the same time how
much remains to be accomplished. For just as the concept of lawyer was
male at the beginning of the twentieth century, preventing women from
becoming lawyers at all, so the concept of leadership is male at the end
of the century, preventing women from being recognized as leaders in
their profession. Thus, the history of women in the legal profession is
inextricably connected to their present concerns. As Gerda Lerner has
suggested:
History gives meaning to human life and connects each life to immortality,
but history has yet another function. In preserving the collective past and
reinterpreting it to the present, human beings define their potential and
explore the limits of their possibilities. We learn from the past not only
what people before us did and thought and intended, but we also learn how
they failed and erred.134
In understanding the "invisible" constraints on those involved in the early
cases concerning the admission of women to the legal profession, we
can begin to appreciate the possibility of similar, equally "invisible"
constraints on our understanding of the nature of leadership within the
profession. And, as Joan Kelly has suggested, our recognition of such
constraints means that we are now at a moment in history when we can
not only "'see' how the patriarchal system works, but also ... act with
that vision - so as to put an end to it." 135
133 Menkle-Meadow has suggested, e.g., that many women lawyers who request
maternity leave will receive it now, but that there is a sense in which most of them feel
that thereafter they will never be "taken really seriously" by the firm. See Menkle-
Meadow, Women in Law? A Review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law (1983)
AMER. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 189 at 197:
Some law firms proudly proclaim their commitment to maternity leaves and
'flexible' working arrangements for women lawyers with children, but many
women who have availed themselves of such plans have quietly acknowl-
edged that they are never again accepted as serious members of their firms.
• ..if women want to be successful in the corporate firm context they are
going to have to do it by adopting the male work norms."
For some information about maternity leave arrangements in Canadian law firms, see
N. Boughton, "Rock-a-Bye Lawyer", Canadian Lawyer (October 1988). Significantly,
it is in the area of maternity leave that women experience the full effect of the social
construction of sex roles; a pregnant lawyer will often be simultaneously valued and
respected as a woman for her decision to make home life a priority on one hand, and
devalued as a lawyer for her failure to make work a priority on the other.
134 G. Lerner, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986) at 221.
135 Supra, note 2 and accompanying text. Gerda Lerner, ibid. at 228-229, has
also commented in the same way:
The system of patriarchy is a historic construct; it has a beginning; it will
have an end. Its time seems to have nearly run its course - it no longer
serves the needs of men or women. . ..
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